FOGLIA & JENNINGS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2013 9:05 AM

Duke Law Journal
VOLUME 62

MAY 2013

NUMBER 8

A HAPPINESS APPROACH TO
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Foreword
ANDREW T. FOGLIA† & ANDREW K. JENNINGS††
Sometimes happiness is as simple as seeing what is in front of our
faces. Though the Duke Law Journal has hosted an administrative
law symposium for the past forty-three years, there are few guidelines
for the symposium’s design. The executive board of Volume 62 knew
that we would be responsible for organizing a symposium, but we had
little notion of how we would carry out that responsibility. We need
not have worried.
In February of 2012, months before we planned to discuss our
1
symposium, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis landed in
front of our article selection committee. Professors John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur’s article captured the
committee’s attention with its strong claim, accessible use of data, and
good humor. Multiple committee members pointed to the rise of
2
hedonic psychology in the past two decades and voiced enthusiasm
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1. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs.
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).
2. See Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz, Preface to WELL-BEING:
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix, ix (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert
Schwarz eds., 1999) (characterizing hedonic psychology as a distinctly new field of psychology);
see also Jim Holt, Two Brains Running, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 27, 2011, at 16 (reviewing
Daniel Kahneman’s THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011), and praising the author’s innovations
in hedonic psychology).
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for an article that grappled seriously with the possibility of applying
new interdisciplinary findings to law. Consensus quickly developed to
make Well-Being Analysis the first article we would offer to publish in
Volume 62.
Once we had decided to offer, however, a second question arose:
would we make the article part of our administrative law symposium?
On this question the committee was more hesitant. One prophetic
editor warned that if we put Well-Being Analysis in the symposium,
we had better be ready for it to be the subject of the symposium,
because everyone would want to talk about it. We decided to defer
the symposium question. We had months to think about it, after all,
and we could always issue a call for papers in the fall.
Five weeks later, we still had not discussed plans for the
symposium, and Professor Matthew Adler’s article came before the
article selection committee. Happiness Surveys and Public Policy:
3
What’s the Use? was rich in philosophical argument and exhaustive in
attention to fine distinctions. Even so, the committee was reluctant to
publish two pieces on well-being analysis (WBA) in the same volume
until one editor suggested what now seems obvious: our
administrative law symposium was staring us in the face. Professor
Adler’s article spoke directly to the proposals raised by Professors
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, and even in that early draft
Professor Adler cited a previous work by the trio. Why wait until the
fall to solicit papers when we could build our symposium around two
articles we already loved? In the two articles we had an opportunity
not only to set a broad topic for the symposium, but also to promote a
specific conversation among distinguished scholars—a conversation
that crossed disciplines from law and economics to philosophy and
neurobiology. It was a conversation that interested us, and we hoped
it would interest others too.
Happily for us, the authors accepted our offer. The symposium,
which occurred on February 15, 2013, featured impassioned
exchanges on the merits of WBA and revealed a generational divide
between scholars that we had not expected back in March of 2012.
Faculty members have asked the Duke Law Journal why it continues
to host an administrative law symposium—surely more than forty
years of administrative law is enough? This year’s symposium was a
reminder of how broad conversations in culture and science can
3. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1509 (2013).
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inform administrative law, and a small conversation about
administrative law can portend large things for the way our
government works. We could not be prouder to publish the pillars of
that conversation, and supporting commentaries, here in the Duke
Law Journal.
This symposium is a forward-looking consideration of WBA,
crystalizing the criticisms and limitations of cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) circa 2013. Perhaps most importantly, it contributes new
4
considerations to an old field that has seen rapid academic and policy
expansion since the 1970s. Hedonics became an applied discipline
with the rise of the role—and idea—of CBA in the American
5
regulatory state. In its essence, hedonics examines revealed
preferences in order to price amenities that lack transparent or
explicit markets. The monetary price of a bond, or a loaf of bread, has
6
long been scrutinized by economists. But CBA, as a hedonic
methodology, has tackled the harder task of valuing far more
ephemeral goods, such as the value of clean air or the statistical risk
7
of disease. Since the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the
use of those valuations has been enshrined in executive orders and
8
statutes as driving justifications for regulatory rulemaking and policy.
4. The public-welfare analysis underlying CBA was first proposed as a principle of
engineering by Jules Dupuit. See E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 243
(5th ed. 2007) (noting that Dupuit introduced the concept of consumer surplus in 1844). The
analysis was grafted into the welfare economics of Alfred Marshall. See ALFRED MARSHALL,
ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 79 (3d ed. 1899) (“We may now turn to consider how
far the price, which is actually paid for a thing, represents the satisfaction that arises from its
possession. This is a subject on which economic science has very little to say, but that little is of
some importance.”).
5. See generally Raymond B. Palmquist, Hedonic Models, in HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 765 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999)
(describing how hedonic models apply to environmental economics).
6. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY: THE PURE THEORY OF
MONEY 200–09 (1930) (conducting an early and foundational analysis of financial interest
rates); see also DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A
REINTERPRETATION 93–94 (1990) (attributing the rise of the Physiocrats—a school of protoeconomists in eighteenth-century France—in part to the study of the grain trade).
7. For numerous examples and real-world applications of CBA, see generally EUSTON
QUAH & RAYMOND TOH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2012).
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979) (requiring that agencies consider
alternative means for achieving regulatory goals and that they choose “the least burdensome of
the acceptable alternatives”). This mandate for cost-effectiveness was modified by President
Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982), which required that the benefits of a
regulation exceed its costs; by President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–48
(1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 745, 747–49 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601
note at 126, 128–29 (Supp. V 2012), which required that all regulations be submitted for CBA by
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Unsurprisingly, CBA faced attack from the get-go because it
works to ascribe monetary-denominated prices to goods and
amenities many may regard—either morally or intrinsically—as
9
“priceless.” Such analysis, critics have contended, is “value laden” in
that it ignores the distribution of individual price preferences for
10
amenities. To some extent, this judgment was conceded early on.
Otto Eckstein, a CBA pioneer and member of the president’s Council
of Economic Advisers, noted in 1958 that “[t]here is no logical way of
incorporating distributive effects into the benefit-cost analysis, which
must confine itself to the one dimension of benefit for the country as
11
a whole.” Still, CBA’s defenders have rightly contended that
imperfect—even morally uncomfortable—measures are better than
leaving regulation to agencies’ untutored, unfalsifiable hunches and
12
assumptions. After all, the person on the street might insist that a
human life is infinitely valuable, or that a price tag cannot be placed
13
on clean water. But the preferences revealed by that person’s

the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA); by President Bush’s Executive
Order 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191, 191 (2008), which stressed the importance of new regulations being
justified by “market failure”; and by President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215,
216–17 (2012), which encourages retrospective review of existing regulations and directs that
CBA should consider “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.”
9. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (taking a critical approach to
CBA’s focus on pricing amenities without taking into account the intrinsic values of those
amenities); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 206 (1993)
(“Consider the difficulties encountered in attempting to force all our valuations of
environmental goods into the instrumental mold. People appreciate many environmental goods
for their beauty. Appreciation is a mode of intrinsic valuation.”).
10. Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed, J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 2001, 199, 201. The origins of CBA were rooted in Marshallian notions of welfare
economics and the marginal utility of income. In 1932, economist Lionel Robbins articulated the
criticisms of this Marshallian approach by arguing that “economists, as scientists, could say
nothing about the relative pleasures of a Brahmin and an untouchable.” Id. (summarizing
LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
(1932)).
11. OTTO ECKSTEIN, WATER-RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT
EVALUATION 36 (3d prtg. 1965).
12. See John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in RISKS, COSTS,
AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 183, 189 (Robert W. Hahn
ed., 1996) (“When potential dangers are brought to the attention of federal agencies, agencies
need to assess those dangers in a responsible manner. Congress can work to inculcate a strong
sense of responsibility by requiring agencies to follow several basic principles of sound risk
assessment practice.”).
13. John Graham suggests that the public is no better than administrative agencies at
intuitive valuations of costs and benefits, arguing that “[w]e are paranoid in the sense that we
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economic behavior, hedonics scholars point out, indicate otherwise:
14
our daily behavior reveals that we do in fact price the “priceless.”
At first glance, WBA is merely a contribution to the hedonics
literature. But its appeal for this symposium extends beyond simply
pushing the boundaries of hedonic methodology. Rather, WBA
proposes to refocus hedonics away conceptually from monetarydenominated regression analysis to a psychological unit of perceived
well-being. In a sense, WBA connects the econometric and
psychometric sides of hedonics into policy-exploitable research. And
it does so in a way that satisfies the moral and intuitive difficulties
that inhere in traditional CBA. The social scientist, the politician, the
regulator, the ethicist, and the person on the street might all agree
that empirically informed regulation is preferable to the hunch-based
approach of a pre-CBA era. Yet, hereto, that agreement might very
well have been one of principle only, breaking down with the
15
problems associated with CBA methodology. In this symposium,
Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur have introduced a
methodology that erects a bridge between these constituents’
empirical, policy, and moral concerns. In other words, they may have
suggested a way to make hedonics work for all the consumers (and
critics) of CBA.
Nevertheless, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
acknowledge that this is only a beginning framework. Doing empirical
hedonics is difficult enough when talking dollars and euros.
Quantifying well-being units perhaps requires a totally different
experimental apparatus. Indeed, the call for WBA requires a
quantitative instrument for happiness. Professor Adler, this
symposium’s counterpoint to Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur, criticizes existing happiness studies in economics as lacking

devote large amounts of resources and attention to alleged dangers that are speculative (at best)
and probably small (or even nonexistent).” Id. at 184.
14. In a seminal article that gave birth to contemporary hedonic economics, Sherwin Rosen
argued that hedonics is a process of individuals sorting between monetary (for example,
housing) and non-monetary (for example, weather) considerations. See Sherwin Rosen,
Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 34, 35 (1974) (“[P]rice . . . guides both consumer and producer locational choices
regarding packages of characteristics bought and sold. . . . As usual, market clearing
prices . . . fundamentally are determined by the distributions of consumer tastes and producer
costs.”).
15. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 12, at 199 (“Many human health and environmental
benefits remain difficult to quantify (for example, the monetary value of slightly improved
visibility on summer days).”).
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econometric rigor. If Professor Adler’s criticism hits the mark, then
the path toward a rigorous and useful happiness or well-being
instrument may stretch many miles past the current state of the field.
But Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur have started down
that path, providing an intellectual framework for making happiness a
quantifiably actionable consideration. If CBA is gauche for ascribing
monetary-denominated prices to hedonic goods and amenities, WBA
provides both rigor and also a measure of price more in tune with our
intuitions about the intrinsic value of things like clean air, safe cities,
unadulterated food, or even our own statistical mortality.
We consider ourselves fortunate to have received two
outstanding contributions to the role of hedonics in administrative
law in the same submissions season. Our symposium, A Happiness
Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis, represents the Duke Law
Journal’s commitment to a discussion of happiness and policy that
will continue at all levels of government. It is a topic that implicates
important values of daily life, and each article and commentary
speaks thoughtfully to the promises and limitations of well-being
analysis. Whatever the future of well-being and cost-benefit analyses,
the Duke Law Journal is excited to present some of the best work in
the field in 2013.

